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ABSTRACT: This paper will build inductively from case studies of Canadian crop biotechnology controversies 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
If the underlying goal of science communication is to bring publics closer to scientific 
knowledge production and dissemination in the interest of creating democratic science and 
robust technical objects, then moments of apparent distance between publics and the sciences 
are meaningful sites for study. In their careful analysis, technoscientific1 controversies may 
indicate how things could be done differently. Some of my work has taken place at the center 
of public controversies over biotechnological2 risk in Canada. Informed by a reflexive politics 
of knowledge theoretical approach, I have opened both “science” and “the public” to inquiry in 
my analyses. Said differently, I have asked into what is meant by “the public” and by “science” 
in moments of technoscientific controversy and engagement. From within this interpretive 
approach to science communication as Brian Wynne (2013) might put it, I have been able to 
reveal that it is the frameworks around science and expertise—the institutional, historical, 
political contexts of expert decision-making—that are at root of public tensions over crop 
biotechnologies in Canada. My case studies make a wider suggestion that frameworks around 
                                                
1 In this paper I use technoscience to refer to practices of knowledge production that make a seamless dialectic 
between science and the construction of special artifacts (technology) as articulated to commercial interest. 
2 In this paper I use biotechnology synonymously with genetic engineering, which is a laboratory practice that 
unlike traditional breeding techniques moves genes (and their associated regulatory elements) between 
species, typically from organisms that would not otherwise cross. Engineered seed technologies grow into 
crops widely called genetically modified organisms (GMOs) but I refer to the seeds and the crops as crop 
biotechnologies. 
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science and expertise ought to be foregrounded, as a normative issue, in democratic acts of 
science communication. 
 I am going to draw on this work in making a two-part argument in this paper: One, 
science communicators have an ethical prerogative to help those in positions of authority in 
science-based institutions critically reflect on the value of their knowledge as well as on the 
frameworks of that knowledge. Two, the theoretical tools of critical communication studies 
(CCS) and Science and Technology Studies (STS) can be brought to bear on this agenda to 
expose the tacit structures of power/knowledge that are often deeply embedded within expert 
cultures.  
2. FISHY BANANAS? DOMINANT CHARACTERIZATIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
AND ITS PUBLICS 
I began my science communication work as a lab-bench molecular biologist. Even though I 
spent the majority of my time pipetting in isolation, I was curious about the role of 
communication in facilitating molecular biology’s wider social relationships. It was 2002 and 
there was enormous public outcry against molecular biology specifically in its agricultural 
applications in the production of crop biotechnologies, but citizen voices seemed removed 
from productive public debate by governmental and radical groups claiming to speak on their 
behalf (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Activist poster online at www.greenacres.com/media/frankenfood_large.jpg 
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I was pretty sure that nobody was actually concerned that peeling a banana would reveal a fish. 
I also wondered, however, about the accuracy of corporate and governmental characterizations 
of oppositional publics as irrational and ignorant, which persists as the dominant 
characterization of publics with concerns around biotechnology. As an example: 
Health Canada has said for years that GMOs can be safely used, and this is determined by the most 
modern scientific information … GMOs are some of the most stringently regulated products in 
Canada and only those products that meet Health Canada’s strict health and safety standards are 
registered for sale and use…. The reality is that it simply isn’t logical to ban these products. 
(Hepworth, 2012, emphasis mine) 
Lorne Hepworth is arguably the mouthpiece of Canadian corporate biotechnology, and in his 
response to a group of people concerned about crop biotechnologies (and asking for a 
moratorium on them) he assumes that: i) this public’s concerns around crop biotechnologies 
will be assuaged with the knowledge that they are subject to governmental regulation informed 
by “modern”3 science; and that ii) in maintaining a critical view on crop biotechnologies, given 
these scientific facts, this public is illogical. By Hepworth’s syllogism, then, critical public 
engagements with science and technology are reduced to problems of deficiency in “the 
public’s” factual knowledge, and dissent stems from the inability of publics to understand and 
agree with experts (the representatives of modern science).  
 This particular transmission model of communication (Shannon, 1949), called the 
Deficit Model, actually came about from attempts to bring publics closer to technoscientific 
endeavours. In 1985 the Royal Society of London published a report titled “The Public 
Understanding of Science” (known as the Bodmer report), which was commissioned with the 
belief that the public’s interest in and support for science was waning and that this “problem” 
could be remedied if more scientists were to communicate the benefits of science to the wider 
public. This was the birth of the Public Understanding of Science (PUS) movement—vigorous 
efforts to promote public knowledge of science and to instill confidence and support for the 
scientific enterprise (Turner, 2008). Deficit thinking motivated this early PUS work. A 
technically knowledgeable polis is the summum bonum for PUS; the corollary assumption is 
that publics are ignorant in matters of science and technology. 
 Within the Deficit Model public sources of knowledge appear as noise (irrational) or 
interference (overly stringent regulatory standards) and they are marginalized or subjugated 
(see Brossard & Lewenstein, 2010). Empirical study after study reveals scientists and 
policymakers conceptualizing “the public” as “passive, emotional and ignorant” (Cook, 2004, 
p. 38), and opposition to technologies is often attributed to a lack of scientific knowledge 
among members of the public (Collins & Evans, 2002; see also Cook & Robbins, 2002; 
Gregory & Miller, 1998). Qualitative studies reveal this science communication model 
operating in Canada, informing interactions between biotechnology’s policy-makers and 
concerned members of the public in the creation of what could be called a technocratic policy 
culture (see Montpetit & Rouillard, 2008; Shields, 2008; Shields & Sanders, 2006). 
                                                
3 It seems that Hepworth does implicitly admit the possibility of alternative models of knowledge production 
whose framing and results would differ from those used in western governance regimes. At the same time he, 
also implicitly, places other knowledge cultures (perhaps farmer or local knowledge) on a hierarchy of 
epistemic veracity, given the positive connotations with modernity in the popular conception. This speaks to 
bigger concerns regarding ethical, racial figurations behind scientific inquiry and practice that go beyond the 
aims of this study (see Harding & Figueroa, 2003). 
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Governmental actors repeatedly attempt to reassure concerned publics by insisting on 
biotechnology governance as “a safety approval process based solely on sound science” 
(Cockrall-King, 2011, emphasis mine). One Canadian biotechnology regulator thinks that 
“pandering” to public concerns would result in a kind of rabid democracy because of “a public 
(and media) that is scientifically illiterate about a technically complex issue” (Shields, 2008, p. 
133). 
3. PUBLIC EDUCATION FAILS BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Enormous scientific and governmental outreach efforts, operating according to the Deficit 
Model, have not yet succeeded in securing biotechnologies as safe and unproblematic; tensions 
in the way the public responds to specific biotechnological practices and artifacts have not 
been cleanly resolved through more public science education (Eichelbaum et al., 2001; 
Jasanoff, 2003). Discussions about the risks and wider implications of biotechnology started in 
1971 shortly after Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer did their pioneering work on recombinant 
DNA technique (Berg et al., 1974). The 1974 Berg Letter introduced the possibility of 
biotechnological risk, and during the Asilomar conference of 1975 a congregation of scientists 
voted to halt recombinant experimentation until more was known. Wider public resistance to 
biotechnology started in the 1990s with the commercialization of crop biotechnologies and at 
the same time public-sector commitments to commercializable biotechnologies also grew. 
Through the 1980s and early 1990s the Canadian government exerted heavy influence over the 
direction of bitoechnological research through massive spending commitments—largely on 
recombinant research directed at commercializable crop technologies. 
 Crop biotechnologies are among the most contentious technoscientific objects of their 
historical period (Byrne et al., 2002). Since their commercial introduction, large areas of land 
have been devoted to the planting of crop biotechnologies in Canada, the U.S., China, South 
Africa, Australia and Argentina. On the one hand, crop biotechnology is signified among the 
corporate and governmental discourse as good technology—good at meeting world food needs, 
producing pharmaceutical and industrial materials through plants and solving social and 
environmental problems through simple technical solutions (see Monsanto, 2002). At the same 
time, however, particular crop biotechnologies are (often violently) protested in many of the 
countries where they are grown. As Andrew Knight summarizes: 
Despite the growth of genetically modified plants and foods in the US in the past decade, controversy 
still surrounds their use. While seed companies, the US government, and many scientists advocate 
their use, organic and environmental and other groups have opposed GM products on various fronts. 
(2009, p.177) 
Legal action is one of the fronts on which crop biotechnologies are opposed. In 1998 
Monsanto’s RoundupReady™ canola was discovered growing on Canadian farmer Percy 
Schmeiser’s property. To Monsanto this was an illegal infringement of their intellectual 
property rights over the genes in the plants growing in Schmeiser’s field and they sued him.4 
Like roughly one quarter of all Saskatchewan farmers Schmeiser found crop biotechnologies 
                                                
4 Patents were granted to Monsanto covering only the unique gene sequences used to create this 
RoudupReady™ canola, but farmers are only permitted to use the engineered seeds if a license is first signed, 
which prohibits them by law from saving seed for use the next year thus rendering them “legally sterile” 
(Magnan, 2004, p. 306). 
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expensive and he had developed his own methods and tools for successful farming outside of 
biotechnology strategies. To Schmeiser, then, the presence of crop biotechnologies on his 
property was a nuisance and, unlike hundreds of farmers who every year settle out of court (for 
a list, see Center for Food Safety, 2005), he counter-sued. Schmeiser’s trial ended after six 
years with a five to four Supreme Court ruling against him. In 2002, in the middle of the legal 
events of Schmeiser, two Saskatchewan organic farmers, Larry Hoffman and Dale Beaudoin, 
filed for class status in an attempt to ultimately pursue Monsanto in court on behalf of all of the 
province’s organic grain farmers. With Larry Hoffman. L. B. Hoffman Farms Inc., and Dale 
Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada Inc. and Bayer Cropscience Inc. farmers claimed that 
Monsanto’s crop biotechnologies had extensively contaminated non-biotechnological (notably, 
organic) land. While on the surface these lawsuits are about what Abby Kinchy (2012) calls 
“seeds out of place,” and the bulk of popular as well as academic attention treats them as 
straightforward legal challenges to intellectual property rights over seeds (c.f. deBeer, 2007; 
Garforth & Ainslie, 2006; Muller, 2006), I make sense of them as activist attempts to exercise 
democratic demands for more open biotechnological governance (Bronson, 2009). 
4. TAKING “THE PUBLIC” SERIOUSLY AS A POINT OF INQUIRY  
4.1 Who Is “the Public” in Canadian Disputes over Seeds? 
Working against the troublesome way that political and corporate culture has imagined, 
defined and dealt with biotechnology’s oppositional publics, I began my study of Canadian 
biotechnological controversies with an inquiry about the public actors involved. I did not 
assume I knew this public as uneducated or irrational. In 2002 I moved to Saskatchewan where 
I began an ethnography of crop biotechnological engagement and use. I focused on the 
particular farming and activist public mobilized into legal action against the large multinational 
biotechnology corporation Monsanto in Schmeiser and Hoffman. Most of these 
farmers/activists follow organic methods and all of them avoid crop biotechnologies for 
ideological or economic reasons (or some combination thereof). My knowledge of this public 
was gathered over two years and 20 interviews with the help of a camera, tape recorder and 
pen and paper, and it was built over many hours spent in farmer’s fields, at farm houses, at 
protests and at a number of local “coffee row” among other cultural sites. A general question I 
posed to the farmers—What concerns you about GMOs?5—is precisely the one that is not 
widely taken seriously within Deficit logic wherein tensions are encompassed by a particular 
kind of epistemic concern: publics oppose the science, the science is unproblematic (according 
to most scientists),6 so negative public reactions to crop biotechnologies are a failure to 
understand the facts.  
                                                
5 While the interviews were open-ended and conversations (they involved sharing of information), I did ask 
questions with the intent of participant’s concerns around and understanding of crop biotechnologies and other 
high technologies applied to farming in a globalized context. In analyzing these data, a series of common 
analytical questions guided me, including: What are the beliefs about the science and technology of GE 
conveyed by the language of participants? How do they describe their scientific knowledge and expertise and 
from what sources of knowledge and opinion does it derive? How do they relate “expert” advice to everyday 
experience and other forms of knowledge on science and technology? How do their evaluations of GE fit into 
a broader context (social, political, filial)? 
6 There is of course conflicting scientific research and oppositional scientists (see Quist & Chapela, 2001). 
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 My exigencies suggested that western Canada’s oppositional farmers were nothing like 
their dominant Deficit representations. In conversing with farmers about crop biotechnologies I 
found that most had a sophisticated understanding of the specific processes involved in their 
production—specifically, of laboratory techniques and their history such as the controversial 
use of plasmids from a bacteria in the laboratory process of gene transfer instead of the 
biolistic method or “that gene gun” as one farmer put it. Other findings from other in-depth 
investigations of oppositional publics also show them to be far from uneducated (Evans & 
Durrant, 1995; Gregory & Miller, 1998). A few of the farmers I spent time with hold university 
degrees in the hard sciences, and all of them exhibited extremely technical farming knowledge, 
including how to keep thriving honey bee colonies at a time when bee populations were (and 
still are) incredibly vulnerable.  
4.2 Saskatchewan Farmers and the Politics of Biotechnological Knowledge 
By treating this public as a legitimate place for inquiry I found that they are not necessarily 
opposing biotechnologies per se nor the process of recombination; rather, their resistance is 
largely about the politics of biotechnological knowledge. These farmer/activists described crop 
biotechnologies in a wide range of cultural, economic, and ethical implications that are not 
being accounted for, they told me, in the currently closed epistemic system of science-based 
risk regulation that operates without any reflexivity as to how it is disadvantaging alternative 
risk conceptions. The working conception of risk within biotechnology regulation is a 
reductionist model wherein the laboratory process of inserting novel genes into organisms is 
incapable of creating unknown or unknowable qualities in them. The farmers/activists whom I 
interviewed put forward a framework for risk that accounts for the unpredictable and the 
unseen and it evades any strictly “scientific” definition. The biotechnological risk profile 
according to these farmer/activists includes: i) the technological ideologies behind government 
funding of seed research (the assumption that high technologies are the engine of individual 
farm and also national well-being); ii) the definition of “facts” used in policy decisions about 
how to apply biotechnologies (the timescale and context of what currently counts as 
hazardous); iii) the context in which these regulatory facts are derived (corporate, not public, 
laboratories); iv) the lack of public deliberation in biotechnology’s implementations (for an 
academic critique see Prudham & Morris, 2006); v) and the limited (reductionist/non-
ecological) perspective informing decisions about funding biotechnological research and 
development (no consideration of the community or societal health dimensions of 
biotechnological assessment) (Table 1). The problem is not gene transfer but the domination of 
a crop biotechnology “value system” over the agricultural research and regulatory agenda at 
the expense of alternative ways of organizing life. 
Table 1. Summary of Saskatchewan Farmer/Activist Biotechnological Risk Profile 
Technological Ideologies (ex. national economic goals informing research) 
Constitution of Regulatory “Facts” (ex. short timescale for risk assessment) 
Context for Scientific Knowledge Production (ex. corporate science)  
Lack of Public Process (undemocratic) 
Narrow (reductionist/non-ecological) Framework (ex. no consideration of the 
societal health implications) 
SCIENCE COMMUNICATORS AS ETHICAL AGENTS 
35 
This is how one organic farmer phrased it: 
Biotechnology is a different value system. The whole value around clean fields, monocultures, 
maximizing production, not a weed in sight … the thousand apples all looking exactly the same way 
… it’s part of a general cultural bias which permeates the whole agricultural system from research to 
implementation towards privatizing, standardizing and industrializing everything. 
Deficit understandings not only render these kinds of public engagements with biotechnology 
nonsense—producing an irrational public—but also assuming the problem is one where only 
“science” is required to achieve accessible and consistent messaging in the public sphere 
(Wright & Nerlich, 2006) only furthers the science-public distance in this case because it is the 
science itself—the frameworks and processes surrounding its constitution—that is at issue. For 
example, interviews (Shields, 2008) show that Canadian biotechnology regulatory actors 
understand their job as one of managing risk, where risk is described as a technical problem for 
the laboratory rather than an overall stance toward possible outcomes from technologies: 
The trigger we use to review a new product for its safety to human health and to the environment is 
not dependent upon the process [the techniques of gene transfer] that is used to develop it. It is 
dependent upon the risk the particular product poses . . . if it poses a risk we are going to review it. 
(Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, 1996) 
But why, the farmers question, do regulatory actors limit risk assessments to the lab rather than 
studying crop biotechnologies in their broader environmental contexts? Why take a short-term 
timescale for risk assessment rather than a longitudinal view? Most of all, why is there no 
process of public deliberation (including public participation) about these decisions, thus 
making invisible the fact that these are decisions taken by people in particular social and 
political contexts? These are concerns about biotechnology only insofar as biotechnology 
already encompasses social and political commitments, which is of course the central insight 
that has been coming from STS for several decades now. These farmer/activists’ potentially 
useful and historically-based assessments of risk, their knowledge and their concerns, thus face 
the challenge of being communicated as scientific and politically valid in the current regulatory 
regime which seems to not have adopted insights from STS nor contemporary science 
communication studies. 
4.3 The Law as a Space for the Democratization of Science 
Facing a policy environment wherein their concerns (and by extension they) are invisible, by 
the time I arrived on the Prairie to interview them, Saskatchewan’s farmer/activists had turned 
to the courts as an arena in which to enact their counter-risk discourse and their democratic 
demands for more open governance processes. This is explicit with the Hoffman case: in their 
Statement of Claim (Plaintiff’s Memorandum, Hoffman v. Monsanto, 2004) the farmers ask for 
a declaration of genetic engineering as a “development” within the meaning of the 
Environmental Assessment Act (EAA), where they say, 
a successful declaration that the testing and development of GMOs was a ‘development’ within the 
meaning of the EAA would operate to modify behavior because the Defendants can be enjoined if 
they should attempt to introduce future GM crops without ministerial approval. This would compel 
the Defendants to submit their engineered gene to a public environmental scrutiny rather than the 
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behind closed doors approach they have been allowed to use with the federal government’s regulatory 
bodies (para. 17). 
In their conversations with me, farmers described Hoffman as a means of opening the 
regulatory process to reflection about the limitations of its current risk framework and lack of 
public process. As one farmer said, “Despite years of lobbying efforts to get a full public 
hearing on the issue of GE [wheat] to date there has been no action, nothing. Nobody is 
listening to us and we hope the [Hoffman] lawsuit can do something to change this.” 
 Using the law as a venue to empower social and political criticisms of technology is not 
new, nor is it surprising that demands for changes in biotechnological governance are being 
exercised in the courts. There is widespread agreement that a lack of novel regulation—one 
addressing the unique concerns surrounding the biotechnological process—has left 
biotechnologies vulnerable to litigation (see deBeer, 2007). But, in 2004 when both Schmeiser 
and Hoffman were in process, I wondered: how do the courts fair as a proving ground for 
different theories of risk and responsibility, different sciences? 
5. TAKING “SCIENCE” SERIOUSLY AS A POINT OF INQUIRY 
5.1 A Reflexive Politics of Knowledge Approach to Science and/in the Law 
I explored this question—how do the Canadian courts fair as a proving ground for different 
theories of risk?—by setting farmer/activist discourses of science, risk, biotechnologies (those 
gathered during the ethnography) against legal ones in a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of 
decision-law in Schmeiser and Hoffman. Situated within a reflexive politics of knowledge 
theoretical approach, CDA is a kind of textual analysis that asks questions of how “social 
power abuse and inequality are enacted and reproduced by text and talk” (van Dijk as cited in 
Wodak, 2001, p. 1) so it was a good method for looking at the ways by which legal language 
might work in Canadian crop biotechnology disputes to legitimate some interpretations and 
reasoning over others.7  
 I focused on legal discourse as an instantiation of what comes to count as science, 
informed by the view that neither science nor biotechnologies are neatly bounded entities—
ones on which the law makes normative decisions. Instead, scientific knowledge is open to 
negotiation with other kinds of knowledge and knowledge systems (farmer, activist, 
regulatory) (Jasanoff, 1995). Through its articulations of science, technology, publics and so on 
the law therefore provides semantic resources that help shape particular ways of knowing and 
being and ultimately a wider political landscape for biotechnologies. I was also interested in 
the ways legal language simultaneously constructs legitimate representatives of science such as 
regulatory experts. 
                                                
7 A set of more particular analytical questions guided my CDA of the decision law in Schmeiser and Hoffman: 
How are science and technology articulated by the legal actors in the case? What is the courts’ designation of 
expertise as they define certain people and topics as relevant, and others not? What is the process by which the 
public concerns over biotechnologies are translated into the legal context? What is the degree to which the 
courts’ imagining(s) of biotechnology shows openness to science and technology as social processes? Might 
the rhetorical space created through the legal discourse and procedure either constrain or enable the ability of 
the affected public to collectively control the development of biotechnology? What is the relationship between 
this lawsuit and its relevant legal and political and social history? What institutional features in the law, of 
regulatory culture or of politics, may correlate with these textual processes and logics? 
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 Just as “the conventional framing of public understanding of science misleadingly 
reifies scientific knowledge, as if it were objective and context-free” (Wynne, 1992, p. 282) the 
majority of judges and lawyers as well as legal scholars imagine that science is purified from 
culture, including legal reasoning (Feldman, 2009, p. 98). A notable exception is Sheila 
Jasanoff (see 1995) who has devoted much of her life’s work to establishing that the U.S. 
courts are enlisted in a process of social and technological change. Certainly the dominant 
conceptualization of biotechnology (seed technologies) in the legal scholarship on Schmeiser 
treats it as something fixed, whose proper use is decided upon by the courts (c.f. Bernhardt, 
2005; deBeer, 2007; Kershen, 2002; Ziff, 2005). 
5.2 The Construction of Science and Expertise in the Canadian Courts 
Taking an interpretive view of science allowed me to chart the processes and techniques by 
which science becomes fixed; a certain “science”—that limited to laboratory-based practices—
is secured throughout both Schmeiser and Hoffman, and it is separated from “non-science” in 
ways that link to power and social interests. In the facts used to inform the Supreme Court 
decision (Supreme Court Judgment, Monsanto v. Schmeiser, 2004, para. 8) Canola is described 
as “a valuable innovation developed for farmers … mainly by Canadian scientists” even 
though social histories of Canadian seed science (Kneen, 1992) actually show the vital 
involvement of farmers. In fact, early plant breeding in Canada was a clear instantiation of the 
STS observation (Latour, 1988) that the production and acceptance of scientific knowledge 
(and its products) is a process of collective innovation involving local knowledge and flowing 
in and out of experimental and social settings. In upholding Monsanto’s patent over the genes 
in the cells in the plants on Schmeiser’s property, the trial judge drew a sharp line around seed 
science, limiting it to the laboratory and black-boxing (Latour, 1987) farmer and natural 
contributions to biodiversity and seed innovation. Rendering discrete genes as available for 
exchange in isolation from an ecological context that could include farmers is necessary for 
upholding property rights over them, but it stands in contradiction to accepted theories of 
biological development (see Oyama, 2000) and also the suggestions made to the Supreme court 
by the Council of Canadians and other interveners in Schmeiser: 
When Monsanto’s chimeric gene is inserted into a canola plant cell, it becomes one of approximately 
40,000 genes that comprise the genome of that plant. The genetically modified genes and cells at 
issue contribute nothing to the germination, growth, maturation, or seed production of the plant into 
which they may be or become incorporated. Indeed, it is plant breeding and selection by generations 
of farmers which has over time contributed to the value of an agricultural plant such as canola. In 
North America, the genome of many other agricultural plants are also the product of decades of 
public investment in plant selection and breeding. (Intervener’s,Factum, Monsanto v. Schmeiser, 
2003, para. 15) 
The trial court judge separated legitimate science from farmer knowledge and 
practice/experimentation explicitly in his final ruling (which was supported by the Appeal 
decision and the Supreme Court majority). Throughout the trial Percy Schmeiser described his 
seed breeding as “experimentation” (i.e., legitimate science). Schmeiser took his own seed 
samples at the same time as Monsanto, detailing a careful methodology, and he grew these out 
in a cordoned off section of his field—under the exact conditions any in vitu grow-out would 
hope to replicate. Schmeiser also sent seed samples to a university scientist (Dr. Lyle Friesen, 
University of Manitoba) for what he described to all levels of the court as an “independent 
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test.” Schmeiser’s grow-out tests8 revealed from 0–68 percent presence of RoundupReady™ 
canola whereas Monsanto’s grow-out tests revealed up to 98 percent contamination. The judge 
used this language in comparing the conflicting grow-out tests and their results: 
Numerous samples were taken … A series of independent tests by different experts confirmed that 
the canola Mr. Schmesier planted and grew in 1998 was 95-98 percent Roundup resistant. Only a 
grow-out test by Mr.Schmesier in his yard in 1999 and by Mr. Freisen on samples supplied by Mr. 
Schmeiser did not support this result. (Supreme Court Judgment, Monsanto. v. Schmeiser, 2004, para. 
64, emphasis mine) 
By this textual move, Schmeiser was rendered a partial experimenter (or unscientific), one 
invested in the testing done in his “yard.” That the judge used “yard” also painted Schmeiser as 
parochial and folksy—qualities opposite those associated with the idealized scientist. 
Monsanto’s scientists were made “experts,” and Schmeiser’s concerns and his field were 
placed on the other side of the credibility line—the one determining whether a knowledge 
claim earns the imprimatur of Science. Schmeiser as an expert was rendered rhetorically 
invisible—to make his field “speak” to the courts he had to find a scientific ambassador for it 
(Dr. Friesen). Clearly for the courts in Schmeiser truth is borne out by the formalized and 
technically-mediated procedures of laboratory-based scientific practice: the Trial Court held 
that, “more significant [than Schmeiser’s or Mr. Friesen’s tests] are the results of genetic 
testing by staff of Monsanto U.S. at St. Louis” (Trial Court Judgment, Monsanto v. Schmeiser, 
2001, para. 48). 
5.3 The Courts Affirmed Regulatory Conceptions of a Deficient Public 
The science produced in Schmeiser also affirms what appears to be the governance culture’s 
understanding of “the public.” One way in which the courts affirmed the technocratic and 
Deficit logic of Canadian biotechnology regulators is by denoting farmer knowledge and 
concern as perceptual or “opinion” in contrast with the presumed “reality” known to public and 
private lab scientists. Percy Schmeiser testified and provided photographic evidence 
demonstrating instances of RoundupReady™ plants having voluntarily seeded itself along the 
perimeter of his property, which he presents as the source of the RoundupReady™ populating 
his fields. His farm co-worker testified that he witnessed RoundupReady™ seed blowing onto 
Schmeiser’s land by way of debris coming from a neighbor’s freshly plowed fields. A 
neighboring farmer testified to the Supreme Court that he had driven his grain truck by four of 
Schmeiser’s canola fields and “lost some [GE] seed. That’s for sure” (Appellant’s Factum, 
Monsanto v. Schmeiser, 2003, para. 105). Monsanto presented evidence and testimony from 
two-dozen witnesses, key among them Barry Hertz, a mechanical engineer hired by Monsanto 
because of his expertise in road vehicle aerodynamics, and Dr. Keith Downy, an expert canola 
breeder. Based on their testimony about average seed dispersal and seed cross-pollination, the 
Trial Court judge rejected the possibility that the RoundupReady™ plants on Schmeiser’s 
property were the result of seed blown or inadvertently carried onto his land saying: 
                                                
8 This is a method for testing a plant for the presence of chemical resistance by growing out seeds into plants in 
a controlled environment and spraying those seeds; plants surviving the application of chemical are believed to 
be resistant.  
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It may be that some RoudupReady seed was carried to Mr. Schmeiser’s field without his knowledge. 
Some such seed might have survived the winter to germinate in the spring of 1998. However, I am 
persuaded by evidence of Dr. Keith Downey…that none of the suggested sources could reasonably 
explain the concentration or extent of RoundupReady canola of a commercial quality evident form 
the results of tests on Schmeiser’s crop. (Trial Court Judgement, Monsanto v. Schmeiser, 2001, para. 
65, emphasis mine) 
Remember that biotechnology regulators, operating within a Deficit Model of science 
communication, apparently (ex. Shields, 2008) view oppositional publics as not having the 
requisite knowledge to weigh up the potential impacts of seed technologies; rather, “the 
public” can and should trust the experts to make any and all decisions about biotechnology. 
Similarly, the Canadian courts deemed farmer knowledge and concern as perceptual or 
“opinion” in contrast with the presumed “reality” known to public and private lab scientists. 
The farmers’ observation of RoundupReady™ seed falling off of his truck and onto 
Schmeiser’s land is superseded by a percentage of contamination rationalized through the 
abstracted (mathematical) inferences of Drs. Hertz and Downey. The courts’ articulations of 
science and publics thus bolster Canada’s technocratic governance culture, and therefore the 
legal language, not just the ruling,9 has important implications for public participation in 
Canadian biotechnology policy. 
6. TOWARD DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC-SCIENCE ENGAGEMENTS 
6.1 The Persistence of Controversies over Crop Biotechnologies in Canada 
The legal discursive techniques of exclusion in Schmeiser and Hoffman work to further the 
distance between Canadian farmers and crop biotechnologies, which presents a democratic and 
also a practical problem. Political opposition to crop biotechnologies among farmers in Canada 
is bringing enormous pressure to bear on scientists, industry, and policy-makers. In 2004 
public (largely farmer and farm organization) pressure forced Monsanto to shelve its 
RoundupReady™ wheat and a Private Member’s Bill (C-474) has recently been introduced in 
Ontario which would for the first time require the government to publicly review the impact of 
crop biotechnologies on Canadian farmers before their commercial release; organic farmers 
have told me that engineered alfalfa would “decimate” organics in this country. Moreover, if 
public discourses and publics are removed from biotechnological governance, this is a problem 
for democratic science policy (see Kitcher, 2001) because it is within regulatory discourses that 
technoscientific expectations are defined, that science and technologies are shaped and 
whereby the parameters of power vis-à-vis our collective technoscientific futures are set.  
6.2 Theoretical Tools for Academic and Practical Work in Science Communication  
                                                
9 The rulings were also significant to the possibility of wider public involvement in biotechnology governance. 
The ruling against the Plaintiffs in Hoffman prevented the farmers from gaining class certification and building 
a platform on wider issues in a legal contest. Had their case gone to trial, the farmers wanted to challenge the 
regulatory process not just with conflicting “scientific” assessments of health and safety but also with 
accusations of democratic illegitimacy (Holtslander, personal communication, 2009) and a positive ruling 
could therefore have forced a change in the regulatory procedure surrounding crop biotechnologies in 
Saskatchewan, allowing for their full public review.  
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It is time to approach technoscience controversies anew. My case analyses suggest10 that richer 
understandings of controversies are developed out of reflexive theoretical perspectives which 
help us move beyond problematizations of “the public” as illogical and irrelevant. A reflexive 
politics of knowledge approach allowed me to shed light on why science education is proving 
unhelpful in the conflict between western Canadian farmers and crop biotechnologies because 
it is the frameworks and processes surrounding scientific knowledge that are at root of this 
controversy. These farmer/activists are presumably not idiosyncratic in their awareness and 
concern about the contexts within which science and its technological products are constituted 
and these are public engagements with technoscience that we as communication researchers 
and practitioners miss if we ourselves are not open to the negotiated nature of scientific 
knowledge production and the non-neutral nature of scientific texts.  
 Critical communication studies (CCS) and Science and Technology Studies (STS) are 
useful in re-tooling (Latour, 2004) the field of science communication because these 
approaches account for the contexts of knowledge production and allow us to see how neither 
words nor scientific knowledge is exempt from the contexts in/by which it comes about. In a 
world (or word) where language is not neutral, technical communication is embroiled in the 
conditions of its production; to imagine otherwise would be to attribute to our field a kind of 
divine authority—the ability to produce without ever being a product, to mediate reality 
without ever being subject to mediation. The persistent Deficit Model of science 
communication assumes such a god-like position, where science communicators simply 
transmit decontextualized factual knowledge to an ignorant public by making it concise and 
attractive. Within a CCS approach, on the other hand, scientific and technical texts connect to 
broader cultural practices that are always-already ideological and enmeshed in forms of power. 
Lawrence Grossberg (1987) has described CCS approaches (see also Slack, 2005) as “radically 
contextual,” because of their focus on the processes by which texts come to acquire meaning 
among particular social groups, and on the basis of historical relationships and hegemonic 
processes—ongoing and shifting power struggles through which certain social groups 
consistently come to dominate others. 
 Informed by the CCS attention to the power of language, we have seen that in my case 
studies I focused on how authoritative legal discourses of science and technology impose a 
narrative structure within which the larger political and social life of biotechnologies takes 
shape. As Grossberg (1987, p. 88) puts it, texts set “the conditions of possibility that enable a 
particular practice or statement to exist in a specific social context and that enable people to 
live their lives in different ways” (see also Foucault, 1977; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Courts 
not only set normative standards for behavior vis-à-vis seed technologies but also what comes 
to count within institutional settings as a seed versus a technology are political representations 
which effect changes in material practices, self-conceptions and everyday lives. Calling a seed 
a technology and protecting it by a stringent intellectual property regime, for instance, conflicts 
with systems of historical knowledge built up over time and instantiated into material practices 
like seed-saving.11 But also significant, calling a seed a technology and protecting it by a 
stringent intellectual property regime requires rendering genes as available for exchange in 
                                                
10  My case studies (see also Bonneuil & Levidow, 2011; Wynne, 1982;) suggest as well that the courts might be 
an imperfect venue for empowering social-political criticisms of science. 
11 Seed-saving is the practice of saving seeds from the “hardiest” or best adapted plants for replanting the next 
year. Selecting seeds obviously involves expert agricultural knowledge but also discrimination based upon 
individual choice and reflecting wider social and cultural values (ex. for smaller apples). 
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isolation from an ecological context that would include farmers, black-boxing (Latour, 1987) 
farmer and natural contributions to seed science and biodiversity as well as reinforcing Deficit 
conceptions of farmers as peripheral to scientific innovation. 
 Similarly, from its inception (arguably, Kuhn, 1962) STS has underscored the fact that 
social commitments and values are the context for the production of scientific knowledge and 
artifacts; in fact, canonical work in science studies (Traweek, 1988) has demonstrated that the 
remarkable effectiveness of science lies in its social organization, not in any alleged inability to 
stand outside of society. In my case studies, I took an STS-informed openness to seeing 
science not as an extra-social body of facts or a given method, but a diffuse collection of 
institutions, areas of specialized knowledge and theories whose boundaries are open to 
negotiation with other forms of social knowledge (like legal and activist) (Jasanoff, 1995; 
Latour, 1987; Wynne, 1992). In doing so, I was able to see how what came to count as 
legitimate science through the Canadian courts was shaped in complex ways that relate back to 
dominant institutional structures, thus they reflect dominant social interests at the exclusion of 
farmer/activist concerns and risk assessments. I was also able to understand the 
biotechnological critique of Saskatchewan’s farmer/activists: this public is not anti-science, but 
they are asking for an unpacking of the social and political commitments that are being enacted 
through the apparently impartial discourses of “science”-based risk assessments in Canadian 
biotechnological governance. 
7. CONCLUSION 
Studies of science controversies, including my own, which have looked at the contextualized 
specificity and power effects of scientific utterances have proved helpful in showing how 
science-based institutions lose public legitimacy when the contexts surrounding expert 
knowledge production are not made publicly transparent (see also Irwin, 1995; Irwin & 
Wynne, 2004). I believe that science communicators trained in reflexive politics of knowledge 
approaches are well positioned to facilitate democratic technoscientific engagements by 
encouraging those in positions of authority in science-based institutions—scientists, regulators, 
policy-makers—to reflect on the institutional-historical, political and personal contexts of their 
decisions. For example: How do scientists and entrepreneurs make decisions about 
partnerships and investment? How do they decide which research questions to pursue and 
why? What timeline for risk considerations do they think is appropriate for nanotechnologies 
and why? What do regulators see as the place of their work in the larger mandate of the 
government (or, do they think about national economic competitiveness and corporate 
interest)? Science communicators trained in CCS and STS can help expose the “regimes of 
reason” (Foucault, 1977) or unconscious ruling values about science and about publics/public 
knowledge at work within institutional formations. The same training that produces coherent 
and internally logical reasoning within rigorous institutions like regulatory agencies lends itself 
to difficulties in recognizing the operational conceptual frameworks (and the limitations of 
these) (Wynne, 1982, p. 160). At the same time this kind of science communication work can 
help to incorporate information from newly recognized sources (like farmers) into authoritative 
discourses (like regulatory), sources which have historically (and tenaciously) been passed off 
as noise in the system (again Brossard & Lewenstein, 2010). In sum, science communicators 
are in a (ethical) position to become active agents of social and political change. But this 
presents challenges for science communication in its theoretical and practical legacies because 
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it means reframing pragmatic questions about how to reproduce factual knowledge with more 
Foucauldian ones: Why are only certain knowledges legitimated and to whose benefit? Who is 
included and who is excluded by certain conceptions of and articulations of science and of 
risk? Who benefits and loses? How am I implicated in these processes? Despite the challenge it 
presents, I am convinced that such lines of inquiry allow us to generate real insight into the 
complexities involved in moments of technoscientific controversy and to build sturdy and 
long-lasting public-science bridges. 
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